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Testimonial or Nontestimonial?
The Admissibility of Forensic Evidence
after Crawford v. Washington
John M. Spires'
I. INTRODUCTION
W HILE forensic investigations and evidence have long been key ele-
ments of criminal prosecutions across the nation, current trends show
that the importance of scientific data is rising. In 2001, for example, more
than two-thirds of prosecutors' offices in the United States used DNA evi-
dence during plea negotiations or felony trials, compared to one-half of such
offices only five years before.2 Also, in a recent retrial for the murder of ca-
sino heir Ted Binion, legal experts surmised that the defense's presentation
of scientific experts to rebut the prosecution's theory of the case was the
most important factor in the defendants' acquittals.3 Perhaps most interest-
ingly, popular television programs such as CSI and Cold Case lead juries to
routinely expect the use of scientific evidence against criminal defendants,
inducing many prosecutors to have "negative evidence witnesses" testify
that it is "not unusual for real crime-scene investigators to fail to find DNA,
fingerprints and other evidence at crime scenes." 4 For better or for worse,
scientific evidence is not only valuable to a successful criminal prosecution,
but it may also be indispensable in the eyes of many jurors.
Before a jury even sees forensic evidence, prosecutors must first es-
tablish its admissibility. Often, such evidence is proffered in the form of a
laboratory report, and the preparer is not called as a witness by the prosecu-
tion. The defense cannot cross-examine the preparer, and the prosecution
must satisfy the requirements of both evidence law and constitutional law
I J.D. expected 2oo6, University of Kentucky; B.A. 2001, Wake Forest University. The
author would like to thank Professors William H. Fortune and Robert G. Lawson for their
assistance in formulating this topic and in writing this note. The author would also like to
thank his parents, Stephen and Susan Spires, for their love and support.
2 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prosecution Statistics, June 13, 2005, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pros.htm.
3 Glenn Puit, Binion Forensic Evidence Crucial, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Nov. 27, 2004,
at IA.
4 Richard Willing, 'CSI Effect' Has Juries WantingMore Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2004,
at IA; see also Jane Ann Morrison, 'CSI Effect' May Have Led Binion Jurors to Demand Harder
Evidence, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 2004, at I B.
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before the report is admissible as evidence. 5 Evidence law requires that
a report offered at trial without testimony from its preparer be classified
as hearsay, and the report must fit under a hearsay exception before it is
admissible. 6 Constitutional law requires that the admission of the evidence
not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 7
Until recently, the reliability-based test of Ohio v. Roberts determined
whether the Confrontation Clause had been satisfied.' However, in
Crawford v. Washington,9 the United States Supreme Court rejected the
Roberts analysis and altered Confrontation Clause principles significantly.
Under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause is implicated when the proffered
evidence is testimonial.1o In that situation, the evidence is inadmissible un-
less the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had an opportunity
to cross-examine him or her." However, if the evidence is seen as nontes-
timonial, Crawford allows the states greater flexibility in their development
of the hearsay law applicable to such statements.'"
The sticking point in Crawford is that the Court expressly declined to
finely detail what evidence the term testimonialencompasses,'3 meaning the
admissibility of crucial forensic evidence when the defendant is afforded
no opportunity for cross-examination is uncertain. This lack of informa-
tion is not a matter of idle concern, and the Crawford majority immediately
received criticism on this point:
[T]he thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state
prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of "testi-
mony" the Court lists ... is covered by the new rule. They need them now,
not months or years from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied every
day in courts throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the
dark in this manner.' 4
Clearly, shedding light on the admissibility of forensic evidence in the
post-Crawford era is a necessity.
5 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The
Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 67 1, 673 (1988) [hereinafter Giannelli,Admissibility]
("When the report is used as a substitute for expert testimony, however, cross-examination is
foreclosed and important hearsay and confrontation issues are raised.").
6 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (198o), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004); see also infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
9 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
IO Id. at 51.
ii Id. at 68.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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The following presents an examination of whether and in what circum-
stances lab reports and other forensic evidence are testimonial. Specifically,
Part II addresses the origins of the Confrontation Clause and the various
interpretations the Supreme Court has accorded it.' 5 Part III considers the
Supreme Court's opinion in Crawford and the work of commentators on
constitutional law (particularly Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Richard D.
Friedman) in formulating a workable definition of the term testimonial.'6 In
Part IV, this definition is applied to the discrete topic of forensic evidence.' 7
These parts show that the issue of whether forensic evidence is testimonial
is to be determined in much the same way the issue is considered for any
other piece of evidence. Part V examines how Crawford is likely to affect
the trial of criminal cases and also analyzes some unanswered questions.'
This part will discuss some of the finer points of forensic evidence prac-
tice post-Crawford. It ends with the conclusion that the effects of Crawford
in the majority of cases are likely to be less dramatic than expected, but
that refinement of the Crawford approach is necessary to deal with cases in
which the theoretical uncertainty created by the opinion makes decisions
difficult.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Background
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states, "[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with
the witnesses against him....", 9 The United States Supreme Court later
held that the right of confrontation was "essential and fundamental ... for
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal," and applied
the Confrontation Clause to the States as well as the federal government.20
Indeed, in an early decision, Chief Justice Marshall said of the Clause, "I
know of no principel [sic] in the preservation of which all are more con-
cerned. I know none, by undermining which, life, liberty and property,
might be more endangered." 2I
15 See infra notes 19-51 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 52-92 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 93-124 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 125-4o and accompanying text.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2o Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,405-406 (1965).
21 United States v. Burr, 25 E Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); see also
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (stating that cross-examination is "the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." (quoting 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940))).
2005-2006]
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But even though the Confrontation Clause is lauded as a necessary ele-
ment of the American criminal justice system, application of the confronta-
tion right 22 in criminal trials is often problematic. This is largely because,
as Justice Thomas has stated, "[tihere is virtually no evidence of what
the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean. ' 'z3 For ex-
ample, the right to confrontation could be seen as extending only to those
witnesses that actually appear and testify at trial.24 The Supreme Court,
however, abandoned this view as inconsistent with much of the history sur-
rounding the development of the confrontation right.2 5 Alternatively, the
Clause could be read more expansively as a bar on the admissibility of any
statement presented without the defendant having had the opportunity
to cross-examine its speaker.26 This theory was also abandoned due to the
certain negative impact such a rule would have on the ability of the justice
system to successfully administer criminal prosecutions.7
B. Hearsay Law and Ohio v. Roberts
One of the major problems that would result from a broad reading of the
Confrontation Clause would be an impairment of the use of hearsay evi-
dence. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. '128 It is common knowledge that hearsay is presumptively
inadmissible, a notion supported by the right to cross-examination guaran-
22 The United States Supreme Court has noted that "a primary interest secured by [the
Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination," Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315
(1974) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965)), and the Court has "treated the
accused's right to be brought 'face-to-face' with the witness as secondary to his right of cross-
examination." Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
lol i, iou i (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Confrontation]. Hereinafter, the terms confrontation
and cross-examination will be used interchangeably for simplicity.
23 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); see also Green, 399 U.S. at 176 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring).
24 White, 502 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see also Giannelli, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 686.
25 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004) ("[Wle once again reject
the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony,
and that its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon 'the law
of Evidence for the time being."' (citation omitted)); White, 502 U.S. at 36o-61 (discussing
the prosecutorial abuses in England that led to the desire for defendants to have the right to
confront their accusers).
26 See Giannelli, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 685-86.
27 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("The law in its wisdom
declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental
benefit may be preserved to the accused.").
28 FED. R. EVID. 8oi(c).
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teed by the Confrontation Clause.29 Nonetheless, much hearsay is actually
admitted in criminal trials by virtue of hearsay exceptions,30 provided the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause are also met. Hearsay declarants
can easily be seen as "witnesses" that the defendant in a criminal trial has
had no opportunity to cross-examine. Thus, an expansive reading of the
Clause would spell the end for nearly all hearsay exceptions. Because the
admission of hearsay into evidence is often essential to a successful pros-
ecution, the Court was determined to avoid that result in Ohio v. Roberts.3'
Roberts sought to strike a balance between the constitutional protections
the Confrontation Clause affords and the criminal justice interests that are
served by the hearsay exceptions.32 After proclaiming that the key purposes
of the Confrontation Clause are the furtherance of "face-to-face accusation"
and "accuracy in the fact-finding process,"33 the Roberts Court formulated a
test based on the reliability of the proffered hearsay evidence.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is un-
available. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate
"indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness. 34
C. Dissatisfaction with Roberts and the Decision
in Crawford v. Washington
Although Roberts remained controlling authority for nearly twenty-five
years, the rule announced in the decision generated harsh criticism from
the legal community. First, although the Court had previously resisted
meshing the requirements of the Confrontation Clause with hearsay law, 35
29 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.1 (2d ed. 1999).
30 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
3' Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,63 (198o), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004) ("But, if [the Confrontation Clause were applied literally], the Clause would abrogate
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.").
32 Id. at 64.
33 Id. at 65.
34 Id. at 66.
35 See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("[Tlhe Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this
Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do so now."); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) ("[Wle have more than once found a violation of confrontation values
even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay
exception.... The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation
of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation
2oo5-2oo6]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the decision in Roberts was attacked for unnecessarily entangling the two.36
Second, the reliability formula espoused in Roberts was seen as "a poor
criterion to determine whether admissibility of the evidence will advance
the truth-determination process.... It puts the cart before the horse, es-
sentially asking whether the assertion made by the statement is true as a
precondition to admissibility."37
Finally, commentators questioned the implicit assumption in Roberts
that the Confrontation Clause applied to all hearsay and argued that it, in
fact, applied only to a narrower class of evidence.38 This latter argument was
directly addressed and rejected by the majority in White v. Illinois as "fore-
closed by [the Court's] prior cases." 39 In his concurrence, however, Justice
Thomas suggested that the Court's understanding of the Confrontation
Clause had "evolved in a manner that [was] perhaps inconsistent with the
text and history of the Clause itself " 40 and that the Court should reconsider
its reasoning "in an appropriate case."'4
As it turned out, Crawfordv. Washington42 became Justice Thomas's "ap-
propriate case." In his opinion for the Court in Crawford, Justice Scalia pre-
sented a detailed analysis of the prosecutorial abuses in English and early
American law that led to the Framers' inclusion of the Confrontation Clause
in the Sixth Amendment. 43 He also noted that the Court had previously
found, contrary to Roberts, that "[tihe primary object of the [Confrontation
Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of
a personal examination ... ." 44 The Court gleaned two conclusions from this
research. "First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 45 Thus, the
Court went on to hold that the primary (and perhaps even the sole) concern
rights have been denied.").
36 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Friedman, Confrontation,supra note 22, at ioi6.
37 Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 22, at 1027-28.
38 See Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Priniples: A Reply to Professor Friedman,
86 GEO. L.J. 1045 (1998); Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 22.
39 White, 502 U.S. at 352-53.
40 Id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 366.
42 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
43 Id. at 42-5o.
44 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 156 (1970) ("[T]he particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the
practice of trying defendants on 'evidence' which consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or
depositions....").
45 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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of the Confrontation Clause was out-of-court statements by "witnesses"
who "bear testimony"; in other words, "testimonial statements."
46
The second conclusion reached by the Court was that "the Framers
would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the de-
fendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." 47 This hard-line
approach to the Clause translated into the Court's holding that, "[w]here
testimonial evidence is at issue,... the Sixth Amendment demands what
the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." 48 When the evidence at issue is nontestimonial, the Court's
opinion grants the states the liberty to regulate its admission through their
hearsay law.49 Thus, under the Crawford approach, establishing whether a
statement is testimonial is of paramount importance.
Crawfordwas immediately hailed as a landmark decision,50 and its effect
on forensic evidence practice is readily apparent. When the preparer of fo-
rensic evidence does not testify, his or her laboratory report itself is hearsay
if it is offered into evidence. 5' If forensic evidence is seen as testimonial,
then, per Crawford, the prosecution must produce the technician or other
expert who prepared it for cross-examination by the defense.
III. DEFINING TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
Because the admissibility of laboratory reports into evidence may now hinge
on whether they are testimonial or nontestimonial, resolving what exactly
is meant by the term testimonial is imperative. Fortunately, commentators
(many of whom influenced the decision in Crawford) have theorized on
the proper application of the Confrontation Clause. Furthermore, while
Crawforddid not deliver a precise definition of what constitutes testimonial
hearsay,52 the opinion did describe the broad outlines of the term. So, while
guidance from the Supreme Court is required to pinpoint what evidence
46 Id. at 51.
47 Id. at 53-54.
48 Id. at 68.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Bruce Kapsack & Steven Oberman, Crawford v. Washington: The DUI Defense
Practitioner's Perspective, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 25 (stating that Crawford v. Washington
is "perhaps the most important case on cross-examination to date.").
51 See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F2d 45, 65 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a laboratory
"report and worksheet were 'written assertions' constituting 'statements' which were
'offered... in evidence.., to prove the truth of the matters asserted (in them)"' and were,
therefore, hearsay).
52 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."').
2oo5-2oo6]
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is properly the subject of the Confrontation Clause (i.e., what evidence is
testimonial), a tentative framework based on scholarly research and case
law is still practicable.
A. Pre-Crawford Analyses of the Confrontation Clause
In White v. Illinois,53 the Supreme Court declined to reexamine the
Confrontation Clause, but, by addressing the issue, the Court appeared
to at least spark new interest in the debate over the Clause's application.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the focus of the Clause
should be narrowed, suggesting that it apply to "extrajudicial statements
only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 54 Thomas was
joined in his challenge to the Roberts approach to Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence by Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Richard D. Friedman,
who each promote a slightly different interpretation of the phrase "wit-
nesses against" in the Clause.55
i. Amar's Understanding of the Confrontation Clause.- Professor Amar's anal-
ysis of the Confrontation Clause is defined by two distinct premises. First,
Amar argues that "the word 'witnesses' in the Confrontation Clause means
in-court 'witnesses' who testify rather than out-of-court ... eyewitnesses
who do not."56 Amar's interpretation is supported, first and foremost, by
what he refers to as the "ordinary, everyday, common-sense understanding
of the word 'witness': someone who testifies in the courtroom." 57 In addi-
tion, every other clause of the Sixth Amendment refers specifically to trials,
prosecutions, juries, etc.; thus, an expanded reading of the Confrontation
Clause "blurs the sharp focus of the Sixth Amendment generally."58 Finally,
this construction of the term witness in the clause is more harmonious with
the word's meaning as it is used elsewhere in the Constitution.59
Having determined that the Confrontation Clause was intended to
apply only to in-court witnesses, Amar turned to the problem presented
when the government deposes a party before trial without any opportunity
for defense cross-examination and then seeks to introduce that testimony
at trial. Amar claimed that the historical bases of the Clause and the text
53 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
54 Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
55 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
56 Amar, supra note 38, at 1046. For a more detailed discussion of Amar's theories on the
Confrontation Clause, see Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641,
688-97 (1996).
57 Amar, supra note 38, at 1o46.
58 Id. at io46-48.
59 Id. at 1047.
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of the Constitution support the extension of the right of confrontation to
this form of testimony as well: "when the government prepares [a witness']
statements as testimony, and introduces them as such to the jury, the gov-
ernment is estopped from claiming that [he or she] is somehow not a formal
testifying 'witness.' 60 Thus, Amar's position can be summarized as follows:
"the Clause encompasses only those 'witnesses' who testify either by tak-
ing the stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions,
videotapes, and the like."'6 1 Amar's treatment of out-of-court testimony is
notably similar to the formulation proposed by Justice Thomas in White.
2. Friedman's Understanding of the Confrontation Clause.- In most respects,
Professor Friedman's perspective on the Confrontation Clause is simi-
lar to Professor Amar's and Justice Thomas's. Friedman agrees that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to all out-of-court statements, but that
the Clause is implicated by in-court testimony and "formalized" or govern-
ment prepared ex parte affidavits or other testimony.6' But, while Amar's
approach requires the participation of the government in the collection of
a statement before the Confrontation Clause is triggered, Friedman would
extend the definition of testimonial to include statements made between
private individuals. 63
Friedman sees his framework as necessary in a system of criminal
justice which admits out-of-court statements at trial even when the state-
ments were not made to government authorities. 64 "[I]n this setting, if the
complainant makes the statement and it is indeed presented at trial, she is
acting as a witness-notwithstanding that the statement is not made to the
authorities, or even at their instigation, or under oath. ' ' 65 While acknowl-
edging the "difficult factual issues" his methodology presents, he defends
his approach as necessary to avoid violations of the Confrontation Clause
via informal testimony.' Thus, Friedman's position can be summarized as
6o Id. at 1049.
61 Id. at 1045.
62 Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 22, at 1038.
63 Id. at 1038-43.
64 Id. at 1039-41.
65 Id. at 1041.
66 Id. at 1043. While Amar acknowledges Friedman's concern, he notes that "the
Constitution is mainly addressed to state action. The document ... seeks to prevent state
misconduct and manipulation, not private trickery." Amar, supra note 38, at io48. Amar's
comment is accurate, but it should be noted that the Supreme Court, in other contexts,
has refused to allow private conduct to interfere with a party's constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of private
racially restrictive covenants was a denial of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment: "State action ... refers to exertions of state power in all forms. And when the
effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitutional commands.").
2oo5-2oo6]
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follows: "[if... the declarant correctly understands that her statement will
be presented at trial, than [sic] the statement does appear testimonial. 6 7
In comparing Amar's and Friedman's respective arguments, it is helpful
to note the differing approaches each would take to determine whether a
given piece of evidence is testimonial. Amar would likely frame the issue
as a matter of how, why, and by whom the evidence was collected; the ana-
lytical starting point is on the reception of the statement.' Friedman, on
the other hand, focuses on how the speaker understood (or perhaps should
have understood) the use to which his or her statement would be put.69 In
most circumstances, the two formulations should yield the same result,7°
which explains the general agreement between Amar and Friedman.
However, when a statement is made with the understanding that it will
be used at trial, but the government is not involved in the making of the
statement, the two commentators would differ in their conclusions as to its
admissibility.7
B. The Crawford Approach to Testimonial Hearsay
Despite its failure to deliver a complete definition of testimonial hearsay,
Crawford did make it abundantly clear that ex parte affidavits and other of-
ficial testimony produced with an eye toward litigation are the precise evil
at which the Confrontation Clause is directed and are therefore testimonial.
In part III.A of the opinion, Justice Scalia noted that the Framers "certainly
would not have condoned" the admission of ex parte examinations72 and
that ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing would qualify as testimo-
nial "under any definition." 73 In the same section, the Court also presented
67 Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 22, at 1039.
68 See Amar, supra note 38.
69 Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation
Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 9 [hereinafter Friedman, Adjusting].
70 For example, assume the statement of an eyewitness to a murder is taken by police
officers or at a preliminary hearing to assist with a suspect's prosecution. The fact that the
statement is taken by government officers would satisfy the Amar test and render the statement
testimonial under his approach. Further, because one in the situation of our hypothetical
eyewitness also should expect that his statement will be presented at the suspect's trial, the
statement satisfies the Friedman test and is also testimonial under his approach.
71 Following the example in the previous footnote, assume now that the eyewitness
makes the same statement to the victim's family. The eyewitness suspects that the family
members will want to use this information at the defendant's trial. Because the family is not
associated with the government, this statement would not be considered testimonial under
Amar's test, but because the statement was made with the reasonable expectation that it
would be used in prosecuting a criminal defendant, it would likely be testimonial under
Friedman's test.
72 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
73 Id. at 52.
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some tentative formulations of the term testimonialwhich directly implicate
official testimony, including:
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defen-
dant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pre-trial statements that de-
clarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial
statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affida-
vits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 74
The Court also stated that the Confrontation Clause applies "at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." T Finally, the Court also
emphasized the requirement that a statement have been prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation for it to be deemed testimonial, commenting that
"[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with
an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse .... "76
The Court, however, presented another possible standard for deter-
mining what is testimonial. This formulation included "statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial." 77 In making this statement, the Court potentially extended the
protection afforded by the Confrontation Clause beyond what was indi-
cated in the other parts of the opinion.
In its analysis of the proper interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,
Crawford reflects the influence of Justice Thomas, Amar, and Friedman on
the Court.78 All of them would likely agree with the Court's holdings that
statements made to a government official without an opportunity for cross-
examination are testimonial. 79 Only Friedman, however, would be expected
to concur with the proposition that the right to confrontation extends to
statements in which the government played no part, so long as the speaker
reasonably believed his or her statements would be used in a criminal
trial. so At the moment, it is uncertain which standard will prevail, but, "the
impact of [Crawford] may be much different depending upon whether the
Supreme Court eventually adopts a relatively broad or relatively narrow
understanding of the term 'testimonial.'' '
74 Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
75 Id. at 68.
76 Id. at 56 n.7.
77 Id. at 52.
78 Id. at 6o-6i (citations omitted).
79 See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
8o In fact, Friedman has described this formulation as the "most useful and accurate" of
the possible definitions of testimonial. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 69, at 9.
81 Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 69, at 13.
2oo5-2oo6]
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C. Crawford " Description of Nontestimonial Statements
Though Crawfordonly sketched out the meaning of the word testimonial, it
did provide some examples of nontestimonial evidence. In Part III.B of the
opinion, Justice Scalia stated that "[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions covered
statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for example, busi-
ness records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy."82 Taken literally,
this statement would provide for the admission of any hearsay statement
that fit into either of those two hearsay exceptions. Further, critical com-
mentary has suggested that
many statements that were admissible under Roberts will still be admissible
under Crawford, though the grounds of decision will be different.... [Ulnder
Roberts, business records and conspirator statements were deemed reli-
able because they fell within "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. Under
Crawford, almost all such statements will be considered nontestimonial,
and therefore the Confrontation Clause will impose little, if any, obstacle
to their admissibility 3
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried stresses, however, that Crawford
also stands for the proposition that, "in classifying hearsay as 'testimonial'
or 'non-testimonial,' the trial judge should consider the specific circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement."8 4 For support, Professor
Imwinkelried cites footnote six from Crawford, which states that, "many
dying declarations may not be testimonial. '85 Similarly, Justice Scalia states
in footnote seven that the risk of prosecutorial abuse "does not evaporate
when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay excep-
tion, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances." 86
Finding significance in the Crawford Court's refusal to generalize
about statements falling within the dying declaration exception, Professor
Imwinkelried postulates that:
[i]f the lower courts accept this interpretation of Crawford, prosecutors will
be unable to generalize that "all" dying declarations, "all" excited utter-
ances, or "all" business records are automatically nontestimonial. Rather,
the classification will turn on the particular facts of the case. When those
facts show that law enforcement officers played a role in the "production"
82 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. The business records exception for hearsay statements is
found in FED. R. EVID. 803(6). The coconspirator statement exception is found in FED. R. EViD.
8o1(d)(2)(E).
83 Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 69, at 7.
84 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Treatment of Prosecution Hearsay Under Crawford v.
Washington: Some GoodNews, But...., CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at i8.
85 Id. at 17-18 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.).
86 Id. at 56 n.7.
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of the statement and that the declarant probably realized the distinct pos-
sibility that his or her statement would later be put to prosecutorial use, the
statement should be categorized and treated as "testimonial." 87
In light of the novelty of the issues decided in Crawford, Professor
Imwinkelried's point is well taken. Courts should not assume a proffered
lab report is testimonial based merely on how the evidence is classified
under hearsay law.
D. Synthesis of the Varying Definitions of Testimonial
Piecing together a workable definition of the term testimonial from Crawford
and its influences is a difficult task, but some broad, reliable guidelines
are undeniably apparent. First, ex parte testimony or other statements
prepared by government officials for use in a criminal trial are clearly testi-
monial. Crawford and each of the commentators profiled herein are unani-
mous in reaching that conclusion,18 though the Court in Crawford did not
seem as focused on the role played by the government in the collection
of a testimonial statement as were Thomas and Amar.89 Second, according
to Crawford, business records, co-conspirator statements, and many dying
declarations are nontestimonial,90 creating the impression that perhaps the
Court did not intend Crawford to lead to a drastic departure from modern
hearsay law.
Between these two broad extremes, Crawford leaves a great deal of
uncertainty as to the finer details of its application. Most notably, it is dif-
ficult to ascertain the weight that should be accorded to the Court's cryptic
statement that a declaration made under the reasonable belief it will be
used in a criminal prosecution (i.e., made with testimonial intent) should
be considered testimonial.9' A proper application of this standard would
no doubt require a stringent analysis to determine what the preparer of a
given statement knew or should have known about the effect the state-
ment would have in a criminal prosecution. Further, as noted by Professor
Imwinkelried, the Court seemed hesitant to classify any broad category of
declarations or documents as testimonial or nontestimonial.92 Therefore,
until the Supreme Court maps out a comprehensive definition of the term
testimonial, the preferable methodology for determining whether a given
statement is testimonial involves a case-by-case resolution of the issue and
focuses not only on the expectations of the prosecution as to how the state-
87 Imwinkelried, supra note 84, at 18.
88 See supra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
89 See supra notes 52-81 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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ment will be used or the hearsay rules applicable to the statement but on
the expectations of the statement's preparer as well.
IV. 'T E APPLICATION OF THE CRAWFORD TESTIMONIAL APPROACH
TO FORENSIC EVIDENCE: THEORETICAL ANALYSES
When a lab report or other forensic evidence is presented at trial, Crawford
suggests that whether the evidence is testimonial Will factor heavily on
its admissibility. It is doubtful that a clear-cut method for answering this
question is even possible given the present uncertainty following Crawford.
Moreover, many different types of lab reports are used in criminal cases.
They have been treated differently in the past and will likely be treated
differently in the post-Crawford era. 93 Therefore, the following is meant to
be an extension of the issues and concerns previously delineated to the
specific context of forensic evidence, not as a foolproof litmus test that
establishes forensic evidence as either testimonial or nontestimonial.
A. Testimonial Forensic Evidence
i. Forensic Evidence Prepared in Advance of Litigation as Testimonial. - Legal
commentary on the subject supports the notion that, at least in some cases,
laboratory reports should be seen as testimonial. For his part, Friedman
argues this should be the case in "most circumstances." 94 Other experts
have opined that "such reports seem obviously testimonial in nature, since
they are prepared in an effort to aid law enforcement and prosecution."95 As
Professor Paul C. Giannelli points out:
it is... valid to begin the analysis by characterizing lab reports as nothing
more than an "affidavit of an expert." Lab reports share the attributes of
affidavits; they are typically prepared by the prosecution in anticipation of
trial. Moreover, due to their aura of "expertise" and the "official" imprima-
tur of the government, lab reports are a particularly dangerous affidavit. The
effect of the use of the expert's affidavit by the prosecution is to shift the
burden to the defendant, who, due to indigency, is often not equipped to
contest the reliability of scientific evidence.96
93 See Paul C. Giannelli, Admissibility of Lab Reports: The Right of Confrontation Post-
Crawford, CRIM. JusT., Fall 2oo4, at 26 [hereinafter Giannelli, Lab Reports].
94 Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 69, at i I.
95 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE
RULES § 8.93, at 204 (zd ed. Supp. 2004).
96 Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 45,
83 0993).
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Further, lab reports are accorded great weight by juries in modern
criminal prosecutions,97 so the admission of a piece of forensic evidence
can often mean the difference between success and failure in a case. If
Crawford and its predecessors are correct that the Confrontation Clause
was inserted into the Bill of Rights to prevent trial by ex parte affidavit,
then it would seem that the Framers would not look kindly on the admis-
sion of lab reports created for use in a criminal prosecution either.
Crawford made it clear that witnesses' statements in pretrial proceed-
ings and other ex parte testimony are testimonial by any standard.98 Cases
decided after Crawford support the extension of that reasoning to forensic
evidence as well. People v. Rogers, a New York appellate decision, held that
because a blood alcohol content test "was initiated by the prosecution and
generated by the desire to discover evidence against defendant, the results
were testimonial .... Admission of the ... test without the ability to cross-
examine the report's preparer was a violation of defendant's rights under
the 6th Amendment's Confrontation Clause.... "99 Similarly, in City of Las
Vegas v. Walsh, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an affidavit of a nurse
who withdrew blood for a blood alcohol content test was testimonial, com-
menting that "an affidavit prepared for use at trial is testimonial." - Even a
cursory reading of Crawford and other commentary supports the decisions
in these cases.
Interestingly, treating reports prepared in advance of litigation as tes-
timonial reconciles well with the treatment of such evidence under the
hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence and its state counter-
parts. Laboratory reports may be admitted pursuant to the public-records
exceptionol or the business-records exception.-°2 But, importantly for the
subject at hand, neither exception will apply if "the source of informa-
tion ... indicate[s] lack of trustworthiness." 103 Many courts have held that
"untrustworthiness" is demonstrated when there is evidence that the state-
ment was procured for its potential litigation value. For example, in United
States v. Blackburn, the Seventh Circuit refused to admit a lensometer
97 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
98 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52, 68 (2004).
99 People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.zd 393, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); see also People v.
Hernandez, 794 N.Y.S.zd 788, 789 (2005) (holding that a fingerprint report was testimonial,
even when not collected at the prosecution's request because it was taken with the "ultimate
goal of apprehending and successfully prosecuting a defendant").
ioo City of Las Vegas v.Walsh, 91 P.3d 591,595 (Nev. 2004);seealso State v. McIntosh, No.
W2003-02359-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 729145, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, zoo5), appeal
denied (Tenn. Aug. 30, zoo 5 ) (holding that a government agent's "forensic chemistry report"
analyzing cocaine was testimonial).
i01. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
102 Id. at 803(6).
103 Id. at 803(6), 803(8).
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reading offered into evidence pursuant to the business-records exception
because it was "prepared at the request of the FBI, in anticipation of a
prosecution .... " 104 In State v. Henderson, the issue was the admissibility of
laboratory reports determining the identity of substances purported to be
LSD and marijuana. In holding the reports inadmissible, the Court directly
addressed the Confrontation Clause, stating:
[T]he records here realistically cannot be said to have been prepared for any
reason other than their potential litigation value. Therefore, when they are
produced at trial in lieu of personal testimony,... they fall into the category
of the dreaded ex parte affidavit. It was to prevent the use of just such docu-
ments that the Confrontation Clause was adopted.105
The Confrontation Clause and hearsay law are not interchangeable,
but the Supreme Court has noted that the Confrontation Clause and "the
evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots." 106 Also, Crawford sug-
gested that statements, including business records, that were admissible
under the hearsay rules would still be so after that decision because they
were nontestimonial,o7 implying that evidence not admissible pursuant
to a particular exception may be testimonial. Therefore, considering the
novelty of the legal rule presented in Crawford, the denial of admissibility
of forensic evidence prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution un-
der hearsay law lends strong support for the conclusion that such evidence
should be seen as testimonial as well.
2. Criticism of Treating Laboratory Reports as Testimonial. -Not all courts
agree that a laboratory report is testimonial. In fact, some courts even seem
to question the idea that scientific evidence can be testimonial. 10 For ex-
ample, in United States v. Evans, the court stated "[w]e are not persuaded
that a chemical examiner's report is made principally for the purpose of
prosecution.... [The examiner] does no more than seek to establish an in-
104 United States v. Blackburn, 992 E2d 666, 67o-72 (7th Cir. 1993). The lensometer
reading was ultimately admitted on other grounds. Id. at 672; see also People v. McDaniel, 670
N.W.zd 659, 661 (Mich. 2003) (excluding a police laboratory report because it was prepared
in anticipation of litigation); State v. Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d 58, 67 n.8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)
(excluding a DNA report prepared "for no other purpose" but litigation).
105 State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tenn. 1977).
io6 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
107 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also supra, notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
io8 In Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Crawford, he stated, "it seems to me any
classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions will
be somewhat arbitrary, merely a proxy for what the Framers might have intended had such
evidence been liberally admitted as substantive evidence like it is today." Id. at 71 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring).
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trinsically neutral fact, the identity of the substance itself."'°9
Similar formulations of this argument are present in post-Crawforddeci-
sions as well. In People v. Johnson, the court held that a lab report of a drug
sample was nontestimonial, holding, "[a] laboratory report does not 'bear
testimony,' or function as the equivalent of in-court testimony. If the pre-
parer had appeared to testify at Johnson's hearing, he or she would merely
have authenticated the document." °10 In State v. Thackaberry, the court
stated in dicta that "[a] laboratory report of a toxicology test performed on
a urine sample neither qualifies as, nor seems analogous to, testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial."' ..
The conclusions in these cases present an unnecessarily narrow reading
of the term testimonial. While lab reports are not testimony as it is gener-
ally imagined (i.e., in court, on the witness stand, etc.), they are nonethe-
less statements of a fact relevant to the case as the speaker perceives it.
Were the preparer of a lab report to state his or her findings in court, then
the spoken contents of the report would qualify as testimony. Therefore,
it makes little sense to say that the same statement cannot be testimony
merely because it is offered in the form of a report. In any event, Crawford
made no indication that whether a statement is testimonial depends upon
its format; instead, it merely defined testimony as "[a] solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact," ".2
a criterion most lab reports would have no trouble meeting.
The major fault with the reasoning in these cases is that it ignores the
fact that the results of reports are not neutral facts and are not simply au-
thenticated at trial. Lab reports represent the end result of a process of
scientific testing on a given substance or other sample, but, "[t]ypically, the
report contains only the expert's conclusions."'"1 3 Requiring cross-exami-
nation permits the defense to expose the scientific bases for the expert's
opinion and also forces the expert to defend his or her techniques, his or
her application of them, and also his or her qualifications as a preparer of the
statement." 4 Cross-examination of a lab technician allows the weaknesses
in the expert's report to come to light in the same manner that cross-exami-
1o9 United States v. Evans, 45 C.M.R. 353, 356 (C.M.A. 1972).
i io People v. Johnson, i8 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 230, 233 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2oo4), rev. denied
(Nov. 10, 2004); see also Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.zd 701, 706 (Mass. 2005) (holding
that chemical analyses of drug samples had "very little kinship to the type of hearsay the
confrontation clause intended to exclude, absent an opportunity for cross-examination")
(citation omitted).
i i i State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3 d 1142, 1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied, 107 P.3d 27
(Or. 2005); see also People v. Miller, No. 249412, 2004 WL 2534367, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov.
9, 2004) ("An autopsy report documenting the doctor's medical observations clearly does not
meet [the definition of testimonial]").
t 12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 5i (citation omitted).
I 13 Giannelli, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 692.
114 Seeid. at 692- 9 5.
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nation of an eyewitness allows the weaknesses in his or her testimony to be
revealed, suggesting that the two should be treated similarly.
B. Nontestimonial Forensic Evidence
While lab reports prepared in advance of litigation should probably be
seen as testimonial, autopsy reports, hospital records, and other forensic
evidence collected and maintained in a routine matter may require differ-
ent treatment. Crawford itself supports this assumption., 1 Appropriately,
this different treatment is predicated on the belief that such records are
generally not prepared for their potential use in a criminal prosecution. In
a pre-Crawford decision, the Indiana Supreme Court allowed an autopsy
report to be admitted into evidence because, "[als a general rule, the exam-
iners who prepare the autopsy report do so for non-advocacy reasons. They
are charged by law with the job of producing public documents relating to
deaths."" 6 Likewise, "[t]he majority rule among state courts is that drug
or alcohol tests performed in the usual course of business of a hospital are
admissible in criminal cases under the business records exception."' I 7
It is not surprising, then, that the courts which have dealt with hospital
or autopsy reports following Crawford have held that such forensic evidence
is nontestimonial. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that a blood
alcohol report was nontestimonial when its preparation was "routine, non-
adversarial, and made to ensure an accurate measurement. '" 8 In Perkins
v. StateI 9 and Smith v. State,'2o the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, on
the same day and with little discussion in either case, held that autopsy
reports were nontestimonial as business records. However, in Smith, the
court nonetheless held that the lower court erred in admitting the report,
"[u]nder the particular facts of [the] case," because admission of the affi-
davit allowed the prosecution to prove an essential element of its case (the
cause of death) by affidavit.12 '
Although the results from the above cases are faithful to the letter of
Crawford, their methodology is perhaps overly cursory. In most circum-
stances, routinely prepared documents will be nontestimonial, as they
generally qualify as business records. But, as noted earlier,'2 2 a case-by-case
analysis of laboratory reports is the preferred method of analysis in light of
115 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
116 Ealy v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1047, 1055 (Ind. 1997).
117 Baber v. State, 775 So. 2d 258, z61 (Fla. 2000).
18 State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004).
119 Perkins v. State, 897 So. 2d 457,464 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
120 Smith v. State, 898 So. zd 907, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
121 Id. at 916-17.
122 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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the complexity of the rule of law explicated in Crawford. The conclusion
that a report is nontestimonial simply because it falls within a given hearsay
exception or is a certain type of document is to slight Crawfords overriding
resistance to the blending of the law of evidence with the Confrontation
Clause and ignore Crawfords statement that the Confrontation Clause
possibly applies to any statement made with the reasonable belief it has
prosecutorial value.
It is always possible that a business record could be testimonial if it was
made in anticipation of litigation or with testimonial intent, and courts must
be vigilant to ensure that defendants' confrontation rights are not denied in
such situations. Indeed, certain routinely kept records seem by their very
nature to be created for their potential litigation value. 23 Thus, a workable
approach to this dilemma would be one that creates a presumption that a
business record or similar report is nontestimonial but also provides that
the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the report was made
for its potential use at trial.
C. Application of the Testimonial Approach to Forensic Evidence: Summary
Crawford and the cases following it illustrate that determining whether a
lab report is made for use at a criminal prosecution is crucial in establish-
ing whether it is testimonial. With that fundamental issue as a starting
point, a reliable test for the admissibility of forensic evidence under the
Confrontation Clause is ascertainable: when forensic evidence is prepared
at the state's request for litigation purposes, it should be seen as testimo-
nial, and the defendant must be afforded an opportunity for cross-examina-
tion if it is to be admitted. Despite cases that hold to the contrary, the fact
that lab reports are somewhat dissimilar to stereotypical testimony should
not alter this analysis. Conversely, when lab reports are kept as a matter of
routine business, they should generally be seen as nontestimonial, unless
there is also evidence that the report was made with testimonial intent
or was otherwise made with an eye toward prosecution. This approach to
determining whether forensic evidence is testimonial is clearly consistent
with the application of Crawford as delineated above,'2 4 and the case law
following Crawford has generally adhered to it as well.
123 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra notes 135-38 and accompanying
text.
124 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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V. THE APPLICATION OF THE CRAWFORD TESTIMONIAL APPROACH
TO FORENSIC EVIDENCE: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
It is important to note three important elements of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence that Crawford explicitly does not change. 25 First, a hearsay
statement will not implicate the Confrontation Clause unless it is offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. '26 Second, when the speaker ap-
pears for cross-examination at trial, the Clause does not restrict the use
of his or her prior testimonial statements. 27 Third, if the defendant's
wrongdoing prevented him or her from having an adequate opportunity
for confrontation, then he may be deemed to have forfeited his right to
cross-examination. 128
At the same time, Crawford will surely change the way lab reports are
used in criminal prosecutions in some noteworthy respects. The most fun-
damental change brought about by Crawford in this area should be obvious:
a lab report may not be admitted just because it is reliable.'2 9 In addition,
because Crawford clearly held that a prior opportunity for cross-examina-
tion satisfies the Confrontation Clause, the desirability of early depositions
to prosecutors may increase.13° Finally, as noted by Professor Giannelli,
state "notice-and-demand" statutes also become more relevant. The typi-
cal notice-and-demand statute provides that a defendant be given notice
of the prosecution's intent to use forensic evidence at trial; if the defendant
does not request the presence of its preparer, his right to confrontation
is deemed waived.' 3' Although notice and demand statutes can provide a
relatively simple method for avoiding confrontation issues, they also raise
problems of their own related to the waiver of Constitutional rights. 132
125 For a more detailed explanation of matters that remain unaltered by Crawford, see
Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 69, at 7-8.
126 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471
U.S. 409,414 (1985)).
127 Id. at 59 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
128 Id. at 62.
129 Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 69, at 8.
13o Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 69, at i i. The use of early depositions by prosecutors
is hindered by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which state that witness depositions
may only be taken and preserved for use at trial when the deposition is necessitated by
"exceptional circumstances" and is "in the interest of justice." FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1).
Friedman argues that Rule 15 is too strict and "should be loosened up considerably." Friedman,
Adjusting, supra note 69, at i I.
131 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-I9(c) (West 1995) (tests for the identity of substances
alleged to be controlled substances); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (Matthew Bender 2003)
(tests for the identity of substances alleged to be controlled substances); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 55-10-410(d) (2004) (tests for drug and alcohol contents of blood); see also Giannelli, Lab
Reports, supra note 93, at 31-32.
132 Giannelli, Lab Reports, supra note 93, at 31-32.
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These changes aside, the excitement and apprehension generated by
Crawford may have been somewhat overstated. Although Crawford does
change the analytical approach a court must take to forensic evidence, the
application of the rules discussed in the opinion should not differ signifi-
cantly from those governing the admissibility of forensic evidence under
hearsay law. An examination of relevant case law shows exactly why this
should be the result.' 33 Under the Crawford analysis for the Confrontation
Clause, as under hearsay law, reports should not be admissible when they
are prepared by or for government officials for trial purposes and the defen-
dant is given no opportunity for cross-examination. The difference post-
Crawford is that such reports are inadmissible because they are testimonial
and the defendant was not permitted to cross-examine; under hearsay law,
they are inadmissible because they lack trustworthiness. Conversely,
when a report is kept according to ordinary business practices and is not
prepared with the belief it will be used at trial, it generally should satisfy
the Confrontation Clause because it is most likely nontestimonial. Under
hearsay law, such a report is admissible because it is deemed trustworthy.
Although Crawford altered the Court's doctrinal understanding of the
Confrontation Clause dramatically, the practical effect of the decision in
most cases is likely to be less pronounced than expected in the area of
forensic evidence.' 34
Of course, forensic evidence is not always easily classified in these
terms. In less well-defined cases, the admissibility of laboratory reports
depends upon the precision with which the Supreme Court defines the
term testimonial in future cases. This issue is raised by the Court's use of
the formulation "statements ... made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial"'' 35 as a possible definition for testimonial.
Seemingly, this test would place the inquiry in this matter on the point of
view of the preparer of the report instead of the government investiga-
tors for whom it was made. If such a reading of Crawford is accepted, the
protection of the Clause regarding laboratory reports has potentially been
expanded a great deal, perhaps further than the Supreme Court originally
intended.
For example, assume that in a state where an autopsy report is a regu-
larly kept record, a coroner performs a routine autopsy on a shooting victim.
i33 See supra notes 98-121 and accompanying text.
134 The Court's opinion in Crawford indicates it was tacitly aware of this anticlimactic
situation. In replying to Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument that exceptions to the general
exclusion of hearsay evidence were commonplace, Justice Scalia wrote, "there is scant
evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in
a criminal case." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
135 Id. at 52.
2005-2006]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Under Perkins v. State'36 and Smith v. State'37 the report should be seen as
nontestimonial. But if the coroner comes to the conclusion that the victim
was murdered, and he inwardly suspects that his report will be valuable
in convicting the perpetrator, is the report testimonial? Under the reading
of Crawford in the preceding paragraph, the answer should be yes. In fact,
a conclusion that autopsy reports are more often than not prepared with
the reasonable belief they will be used in litigation is not unreasonable,
especially when the cause of death is violent.13 Such an approach would,
however, represent a divergence from pre-Crawford practice,39 a step the
Supreme Court may not be willing to take. Issues like this one demonstrate
the difficulties presented when a court is forced to inquire into the reason-
able beliefs of witnesses and their reasonable expectations. 140 Lower courts
need to know whether they should take this step.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though it appeared that Crawford would cause a sea change in the use of
forensic evidence in criminal trials, the foregoing suggests that these con-
cerns are largely unfounded. The approach to the admissibility of forensic
evidence under the Confrontation Clause has been changed, but, generally,
the end result of the new doctrine is unlikely to be more or less exclusion-
ary than before. Though case research shows that some courts have applied
the definition of testimonial hearsay more restrictively than such a conclu-
sion might suggest,' 4' those cases represent theoretical disagreements as
to the nature of forensic evidence, not differences in the application of the
underlying constitutional doctrine.
The difficulties of Crawford's approach to the Confrontation Clause
lie more in its finer details. In many ways, the confusion over the future
application of Crawford in this arena reflects the same ideological conflict
136 Perkins v. State, 897 So. 2d 457 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
137 Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
138 Interestingly, in Justice Scalia's description of early American evidentiary practices,
he cited State v. Campbell, a South Carolina decision in which a coroner's deposition was
excluded because the defendant had had no opportunity to cross-examine him. Crawford,
541 U.S. at 49 (citing 30 S.C.L. (i Rich.) 124 (S.C. i844)). The Campbellcourt held that "such
depositions are ex parte, and, therefore, utterly incompetent.... [One of the guarantees of
the State Constitution is that] prosecutions be carried on to the conviction of the accused, by
witnesses confronted by him, and subjected to his personal examination." Campbell, 30 S.C.L.
at 125.
139 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
140 It is easy to imagine other cases in which the Crawford testimonial approach will
be difficult to apply to forensic evidence. For example, how should a court treat a lab report
prepared by a private investigator or nongovernment laboratory?
141 Seesupra notes io8-14 and accompanying text.
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that divides Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Richard D. Friedman.42 The
Confrontation Clause was promulgated to prevent trial by ex parte affida-
vit. Whether one focuses on the mindset of the speaker or the recipient, a
statement made by a laboratory technician at the behest of the government
is testimonial. Similarly, statements made routinely and without state par-
ticipation in their preparation are nontestimonial. The difficulty lies in the
gray area between these two extremes. That is where Amar and Friedman
disagree, it is where Crawford is notoriously difficult to apply, and it is where
future interpretation from the Supreme Court is desperately needed.
142 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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